Security in CI

Who may read, start, cancel and configure what (IAM), what is audited, and how runs are kept from reaching machines and secrets they should not.

Last updated 18 November 2026View as Markdown

IAM actions

CI is checked per repository: run, log, artifact, environment and repository-variable actions are evaluated on rn:ews::<organization id>:ci:repository/<repository id>, never on a single run. Organization-wide things are evaluated on rn:ews::<organization id>:ci:*: listing runs across repositories, runners, runner groups, runner pools, organization variables, and checking or converting a workflow file.

ActionAccessWhat it allows
ci:ListRunsReadList workflow runs for a repository
ci:GetRunReadView a workflow run, its jobs and steps
ci:GetRunLogsRead · sensitiveRead workflow run logs
ci:ListArtifactsReadList the artifacts a workflow run produced
ci:DownloadArtifactRead · sensitiveDownload a build artifact
ci:DeleteArtifactWrite · destructiveDelete a build artifact before it expires
ci:CancelRunWrite · destructiveCancel a workflow run that is still in progress
ci:RerunWorkflowWriteStart a new run of a workflow at the same commit
ci:StartWorkflowWriteStart a workflow by hand at a branch or tag (workflow_dispatch / on.manual), with inputs
ci:DescribeRunnersReadList the self-hosted runners registered to this organization
ci:ManageRunnersWrite · destructiveIssue a runner registration token, and disable a runner
ci:DescribeRunnerPoolsReadList runner pools, their machines and scaling decisions
ci:CreateRunnerPoolWriteCreate a runner pool: machines started for the jobs its labels match
ci:UpdateRunnerPoolWriteChange a runner pool's sizes, labels or machine reuse
ci:DeleteRunnerPoolWrite · destructiveDelete a runner pool and its machines (a running job finishes first)
ci:ListVariablesReadList configuration variables (vars) of the organization, a repository or an environment
ci:PutVariableWriteCreate or change a configuration variable
ci:DeleteVariableWrite · destructiveDelete a configuration variable
ci:ListEnvironmentsReadList a repository’s deployment environments, their protection rules and pending approvals
ci:PutEnvironmentWriteCreate an environment or change its protection rules (reviewers, wait timer, deployment branches)
ci:DeleteEnvironmentWrite · destructiveDelete an environment, its rules and its variables
ci:ReviewDeploymentsWriteApprove or reject a job waiting at an environment (the environment must also list you as a reviewer)
ci:CreateIdTokenWriteIssue an OIDC identity token to a running job (recorded for every token)

Generated from the service’s IAM descriptor. Sensitive reads hand over secret material or source code and are recorded in the audit log like writes; destructive writes delete, overwrite or revoke.

  • ci:GetRunLogs and ci:DownloadArtifact are sensitive: build output can carry anything a step printed. The read-only policies leave them out, and every request is recorded in the audit log, allowed or refused.
  • ci:ManageRunners on a repository issues registration tokens for that repository only; runner groups, moving and disabling runners need it on ci:*.
  • ci:CreateRunnerPool also needs autoscaling:CreateLaunchTemplate, autoscaling:CreateAutoScalingGroup and ec2:RunInstances.
  • ci:ReviewDeployments is not enough to approve a deployment: the environment must list you as a reviewer.
  • ci:CreateIdToken is granted by no policy. A job's permissions: id-token: write and its environment's rules decide; the action names the audit entry of every token issued.
  • Committing a workflow file is a push: git:PushRepository.

Audit

Every write through the API that reaches its permission check is recorded in the audit log, allowed or denied: cancel, re-run, manual start, runner and group changes, pools, variables, environments and reviews. Every read of logs or an artifact is recorded too, allowed or refused. A request refused earlier, for an id that is not valid or a body that does not parse, is not. Every OIDC token issued, and every refused one, is recorded as ci:CreateIdToken. See Audit log.

What a run can reach

  • A run acts as its repository's run identity, which works on that repository only and publishes only to the registry repositories of its own name (see What runs on your machines). Its clone token can only read; a GitHub-syntax job's token can do what the job's permissions: allow (see Call the GitHub API from a job).
  • Secrets are judged against the person who started the run. A re-run keeps the original run's person: re-running someone else's run never hands it your secrets. A run that has no such person (an SSH push, a push to a pull request's branch, a pull request reopened by someone other than its author) gets no secrets: when it reads a secret that exists, it fails with "This run has no triggering IAM user, so no policy can be evaluated and secrets are withheld. …".
  • A secret reaches a job only when the job names it, the secret is granted to actions for the repository, and the person who started the run may read it.
  • An environment with reviewers holds its jobs until one approves; on your runners and runner pools such a job reaches no machine before then.

Your own machines

There are no forks: whoever can push a branch decides what that branch's runs execute. A runner in Default takes runs from any repository and any branch, pull requests included.

  • Keep deploy or secret-manager credentials only on runners in a group that takes protected branches only.
  • Prefer machines that take one job and are retired (--ephemeral for GitHub's runner) for runners that take unprotected branches, or runner pools with Fresh machine per job.
  • The Deutsche Cloud agent on a Mac runs jobs natively, as root, next to your files; the agent's own credential never reaches a step.
  • A registration token registers one machine within 15 minutes and is stored only as a hash. Labels it fixes cannot be widened by the machine, so a machine cannot call itself deploy to be sent deploy jobs.
  • Disabling a runner revokes its credential at once.
Did this page help you?